Thoughts on the economics of America's new Middle East war, what Pedro Sanchez gets right on NATO, why the West is being shut out of Africa, Brexit's 9th anniversary an Iranian history lessons
Thanks Simon, the issue seems to be parked in the 'too difficult' - 'too awkward' bin. (1) in the UK Brexit split both major parties and has given rise to a populist insurgent which is prospering even though its foundational policy is in tatters - party managers in the two main parties prefer to hold on to their existing coalitions rather than utilize growing European sentiment. (2) the full implications of the current war with the ex-USSR are not clear to the general public. The wholly repulsive nature of Putin's ethno-nationalist regime has not been exposed to the man and woman on the street. (3) the very distraction of Trump. His charisma and ability to attract extensive support from 'ethno-nationalists' continue to fascinate and repel. The implications of his visceral dislike of the 1945 settlement has not been internalized by European elites. (4) finally - the UK political elites squandered the opportunity to shape European politics in 1916. Now they fear the learning curve will be too difficult even as defense-related policies argue for an integrated Europe-wide military force (knowledge of languages, of modus operandi). Strange because, unlike major global (foreign owned corporations) the UK's SME sector is strongly tilted in favor of reintegration.
Thanks for this, Frank, and sorry for the slow response. I agree with your analysis and I think you have summed up the problem very succinctly. My comment was as much directed at European political elites as those in the UK as they have access to more levers, particularly at the economic level, given how the UK has boxed itself in. One of the main things I learned during my five years at The Times was never to underestimate the power of narratives, which in UK politics and media invariably substitute for analysis. The problem in Britain is that narratives on Europe are deeply entrenched and hard to shift - which is one of the reasons why I launched Wealth of Nations...
Thanks Simon, the issue seems to be parked in the 'too difficult' - 'too awkward' bin. (1) in the UK Brexit split both major parties and has given rise to a populist insurgent which is prospering even though its foundational policy is in tatters - party managers in the two main parties prefer to hold on to their existing coalitions rather than utilize growing European sentiment. (2) the full implications of the current war with the ex-USSR are not clear to the general public. The wholly repulsive nature of Putin's ethno-nationalist regime has not been exposed to the man and woman on the street. (3) the very distraction of Trump. His charisma and ability to attract extensive support from 'ethno-nationalists' continue to fascinate and repel. The implications of his visceral dislike of the 1945 settlement has not been internalized by European elites. (4) finally - the UK political elites squandered the opportunity to shape European politics in 1916. Now they fear the learning curve will be too difficult even as defense-related policies argue for an integrated Europe-wide military force (knowledge of languages, of modus operandi). Strange because, unlike major global (foreign owned corporations) the UK's SME sector is strongly tilted in favor of reintegration.
Thanks for this, Frank, and sorry for the slow response. I agree with your analysis and I think you have summed up the problem very succinctly. My comment was as much directed at European political elites as those in the UK as they have access to more levers, particularly at the economic level, given how the UK has boxed itself in. One of the main things I learned during my five years at The Times was never to underestimate the power of narratives, which in UK politics and media invariably substitute for analysis. The problem in Britain is that narratives on Europe are deeply entrenched and hard to shift - which is one of the reasons why I launched Wealth of Nations...
Thanks - a typo - 1916 should read 2016 - though the first poses interesting questions!